We explore the implications of aggregate uncertainty regarding the short-term interest rate in a dynamic model of firm financing with two key frictions: a moral hazard problem in the relationship between the firm and its outside financiers, and earnings retention as the only source of inside financing. Financial frictions make firms unable to adjust immediately to their target debt ratios after changes in the risk-free interest rate. We embed the financing model in a model of industry dynamics and analyze how changes in the interest rate affect firms in different stages of their lives. The model delivers patterns of leverage and survival rates (by age) consistent with empirical evidence. The predictions regarding the effect of a shift in the interest rate on credit risk show (i) a very different reaction of old and young firms, and (ii) an asymmetric response of all firms to increases and decreases in the short-term rate. These predictions suggest new lines of empirical research.
Introduction
The role of the risk-free interest rate in the current crisis has been emphasized from both academic and non-academic perspectives. The main concern has been that low interest rates, and the low cost of debt associated to them, could have incentivated firms to lever up their balance sheets. This, in turn, would have made some firms more vulnerable to increases in the interest rate. In spite of the relevance of this issue, literature on dynamic firm financing has not considered how aggregate uncertainty regarding the risk-free interest rate affects dynamic decisions of firm financing and its impact on credit risk.
In this paper, we propose a dynamic model of firm financing with two main frictions: an informational friction due to a moral hazard problem between entrepreneurs and their outside financiers and a financial friction caused by the impossibility of entrepreneurs to internally raise funds other than through earnings retention.
The moral hazard problem arises because outsiders cannot observe some actions taken by entrepreneurs. Specifically, we consider a setting in which entrepreneurs can affect the failure probability of the project under their management. As in Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) , entrepreneurs enjoy private benefits which can be increased at the cost of increasing their projects' probability of failure. This moral hazard problem generates an endogenous cost of outside financing, which tends to encourage entrepreneurs to enjoy greater private benefits (and induce higher failure probabilities) than what would be first best optimal.
We also assume that discount rate of entrepreneurs is always higher than the expected rate of return required by outside financiers. This creates a prima facie case for outside finance and can be justified as a result of unmodelled tax distortions that favor outside debt financing, or a reduced-form for the discount for undiversifiable idiosyncratic risk that would emerge with risk aversion.
Outside financing takes the form of short-term debt. 1 Entrepreneurs start-up penniless and have to rely on this form of debt to finance initial investment. But, after starting up, they can use earnings retention to reduce the reliance of their firm on outside financing. Alternatively, they can pay dividends to themselves, but these dividends are immediately consumed and cannot be re-injected into the firm at a later date.
We incorporate this basic dynamic financing problem of a firm in a model of industry dynamics with aggregate uncertainty due to the fluctuations in the short-term risk-free rate, which determines the expected rate of return required by outside financiers. We assume that the risk-free rate follows an exogenous two-state Markov chain.
In this model, age is the main source of heterogeneity across firms (younger firms having larger leverage ratios) and firms exit the industry when they fail. Entry is modeled by assuming that there is a large number of potential entrants whose (non-pecuniary) cost of entry is increasing in the number of firms already established in the industry. This is a convenient way of capturing congestion or aggregate decreasing returns to scale in finding a profitable investment opportunity. The model delivers patterns of leverage ratios and default probabilities that are decreasing with age; that is, older firms have lower levels of debt and lower default probabilities than younger ones. This is consistent with empirical evidence found in the literature.
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The main results of our paper are its predictions of the effect of a shift in the risk-free interest rates. These predictions are in the time-series as well as in the cross-section dimensions. In the time-series, our model predicts that, for any firm, increases and decreases in the interest rate have asymmetric effects on leverage ratios and default probabilities. 3 In the cross-section, it is found that young and old firms react very differently (even in opposite directions) to changes in the risk-free rate.
In order to get some intuition of the asymmetric effect of changes in the interest rate, consider the following situation. Imagine the economy has had low interest rates for some periods. Low interest rates make debt cheaper, so leverage ratios are high. Consider a rise in the short-term interest rate (e.g. due to a tightening in monetary policy). This shift has two effects: a direct effect and a transitional effect. The direct effect implies that as debt becomes more expensive, firms would like to push down their leverage ratios. However, firms do not have access to inside funds other than earnings retention, so they may not be able to adjust immediately to their desired leverage ratio. The transitional effect is due to the moral hazard problem: previously committed debt is more expensive, so the cash flows left to the entrepreneur are reduced. This implies that entrepreneurs would have less incentives to behave properly, in which case default probabilities are likely to increase making debt even 2 See, for example, Evans (1987) or Audretsch (1991) . 3 Empirical literature on the effects of changes in the interest rate on the real economy have also found asymmetric effects of increases and decreases of the interest rate on the output (Cover (1992) ). Concretely, it is found that positive shocks on money supply do not have any effect on output, while negative shocks do. The literature typically attributes the asymmetries to nominal rigidities (Weise (1999) ). more expensive. This would lead financiers to increase even more the repayment required in case of success.
The key point is then to know which of these two effects dominates in each particular situation. The answer depends on the capability of firms to adjust to the new optimal leverage ratio. In general, the second effect will play a role only temporarily until the firm reaches the optimal debt ratio. The number of transitional periods depends on the financial situation of the firm before the shift in the interest rate.
The cross-section prediction derives from the different financial situation of young and old firms before the shift in the interest rate. Old firms are in a better situation because they have already subsumed the debt burden caused by initial investment. Instead, young firms still have large levels of debt. This implies that after a decrease in the interest rate, old firms want their leverage ratio to go up, because debt is cheaper, while young firms take profit from the lower price of debt to diminish their debt ratios as much as they can. After an increase in the interest rate, the opposite happens: old firms decreases their leverage ratio (although not as much as they want because of financial frictions), while young firms are forced to increase it.
Knowing the reaction of firms in different stages of their lives, we can also study how aggregate measures will behave. It is clear from the previous discussion that these measures depend on the age distribution of firms. In our parameterization, which is based on the calibration of the model to match selected empirical moments, the ages of firms have an exponential distribution. 4 In our aggregate economy, both increases and decreases in the interest rate brings about an immediate increase in the default rate. However, in the long run, an increase in the short-term rate produces a decrease in aggregate default rates, while a decrease causes an increase in aggregate default rates.
Our paper is in the intersection between dynamic corporate finance and firm dynamics literature. We borrow our modeling of informational frictions from corporate finance literature, following Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) and Repullo and Suarez (2000) . However, we extend their analysis to a multiperiod setup. Also, we consider a simpler way of financing, since there is no wealth accumulation outside the firm (no inside financing can be made by equity injections). We abstract from banks' role in screening or disciplining their borrow-ers and focus on corporate debt without distinguishing between market and bank debt. We attempt to understand to which extent the impact of short-term interest rates on the cost of external funding can explain variation in credit risk in line with cross sectional and time series evidence.
From the corporate finance literature, the most related paper is Cooley and Quadrini (2006) . This paper studies the link between monetary policy and financial decisions of firms in a general equilibrium model with money and corporate financial frictions but without credit risk, that is, loans are fully collateralized. They find that positive shocks to the interest rate have a negative effect on the level of debt chosen by firms. Also, the effect is larger for smaller and younger firms.
Macroeconomic conditions in the context of dynamic financing decisions of firms has been previously studied in, for example, Hackbarth et al. (2006) . Instead of focusing on the risk-free rate, the authors consider aggregate shocks to cash flows. Their model delivers some implications that are consistent with empirical evidence. Concretely, they obtain countercyclical leverage ratios and realistic credit spreads.
The literature on firm dynamics has not explicitly considered the effect of changes in interest rates. Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006) consider a framework with optimal long-term debt contracts in which firms are constrained until they reach certain size, so young firms are, on average, more constrained than old firms. However, they do not take into account any sort of aggregate uncertainty and, thus, the threshold level above which firms are unconstrained is an absorbing state. Instead, we propose a model in which this level changes with interest rates, making empirical implications more realistic.
Our paper is also related to the literature on the credit channel of monetary policy transmission, which states that monetary policy can affect relevant variables in credit markets like the supply of loans by banks (the bank lending channel) or the net worth of firms (balance sheets), which can affect the level of credit in the economy. 5 This, in turn, would affect investment in the economy. Although the results in our paper cannot be taken as normative due to the exogeneity of the fluctuations in the risk-free rate, they can suggest some effects of monetary policy actions. Concretely, we postulate an alternative view to monetary policy transmission by abstracting from the role of lenders and focusing on the demand side of financial markets. As in the static analysis of Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) and Repullo and Suarez (2000) , shifts in the risk-free interest rate can have real effects due to the change in 5 For an excellent overview of this literature, see Bernanke and Gertler (1995) .
entrepreneurs' incentives and endogenous borrowing constraints that they could induce. Some recent empirical works have tried to estimate, directly or indirectly, the effect the effect of interest rates on credit risk. However, there is not a clear consensus about this effect. Jacobson et al. (2008) estimate the determinants of corporate defaults using data on Swedish firms to analyze how aggregate variables affect default rates. They find that macroeconomic conditions strongly influence the credit risk of firms. Concretely, they obtain a positive sign for the effect of interest rates on default rates. However, two similar papers, Ioannidou et al. (2007) and Jiménez et al. (2007) , have found that higher interest rates prior to the origination of a loan reduces its default probability. The asymmetries and sources of heterogeneity in the response to interest rate shifts that we identify are consistent with the ambiguity of aggregate effects found in linear models and suggests alternative empirical strategies for further research.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 studies optimal decisions and equilibrium conditions in the model. In Section 4 we solve the model numerically under a reasonable parametrization and analyze its main properties. Section 5 focuses on the effects of changes in the interest rate and Section 6 provides some sensitivity checks. Section 7 concludes.
The model
We consider a discrete time economy with an infinite number of periods, t = 0, 1, ... There are two classes of risk neutral agents in the economy: lenders and entrepreneurs.
Lenders play an important but passive role in the model: they extent one-period loans in every period in exchange for an expected rate of return r t , which can be interpreted as the short-term risk free interest rate. We treat r t as an exogenous random variable that follows a Markov chain with two possible states: r H and r L . The transition probability matrix is denoted by Π, with π ij being the probability of going from a period with an interest rate equal to r i to a period with interest rate equal to r j .
Entrepreneurs are the key agents in the model. In each period, a new cohort of potential entrepreneurs is born. They are potentially infinitely-lived and are born penniless but with access to an investment project each. They can obtain one-period funding from the lenders and act as both managers and shareholders of the resulting firm. Their discount factor is denoted by β, which is assumed to be lower than 1/(1 + r H ). So, entrepreneurs are assumed to be less patient than market investors, which create a prima facie cause for financing their projects with outside funds. Their lower patience can be interpreted as the demand for a larger expected rate of return on their own wealth invested in the project which, in turn, may respond to the fact that such investment is less well diversified and less liquid than those of outside investors.
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When born, new entrepreneurs face two costs in order to enter into the economy: an entry cost, F , and an initial investment, which is normalized to one monetary unit. New entrepreneurs differ in their entry cost, which may be understood as the cost of finding a business opportunity. It seems reasonable to assume that as the number of firms in the economy increases, the average entry cost also increases. Thus, we consider that the entry cost for each entrepreneur follows an exponential distribution with density
where n t is the number of firms operating in the economy in period t. Formally, the assumption about the relationship between n t and F allows us to have an equilibrating mechanism for the total number of active firms in the economy.
The investment project also requires one unit of investment in the period in which the entrepreneur is born. After this, in each period t the project generates a net income or cash flow of y with probability p t and breaks down (or fails) with probability 1 − p t . If the project fails, it yields a liquidation cash flow L (out of the residual value of the initial investment) and disappears forever. From an entrepreneur's perspective, this is equivalent to dying.
A key feature of the model is that the continuation probability p t is an unobservable decision of the entrepreneur. Importantly, an entrepreneur could have incentives to set p t lower than one because choosing a high p t has costs in terms of sacrificing private benefits that the entrepreneur can extract from the project. The flow of private benefits received while the project remains in operation is given by the function U (p t ), which is parameterized as follows
where µ > 0 and α > 1. The function is then concave, which means that the marginal utility of the private benefits is decreasing. The private benefits corresponding to period t are received independently of whether the firm continues or fails at t. However, if the firm fails, the entrepreneur stops receiving cash flow or private benefits in any future period.
Optimal decisions and equilibrium
In this section, we analyze in more detail the dynamic optimization problems of established and new entrepreneurs. We describe their respective problems and analyze their properties.
In the final part of the section, we present a formal definition of the equilibrium.
Incumbent entrepreneurs
Entrepreneurs maximize the discounted expected sum of future cash flows, which include both dividends, denoted by d t , and private benefits. Their problem can be written in a recursive form as follows
subject to
where R t is the repayment due to lenders at t, b t is the amount borrowed at t in exchange of R t+1 , and V (R t , r t ) is the value of the firm for the entrepreneur. Expressions (4) to (6) are the constraints faced by the entrepreneur. The first one represents the dynamic financing constraint. Expenses (dividends and debt repayment) are in the left hand side, while sources of funds (project's cash flow and debt issuance) are in the right hand side. This constraint is complemented by the non-negativity constraint on dividends, as expressed in (5).
Expression (6) is the incentive compatibility constraint of the entrepreneur. This constraint states that the entrepreneur's choice of p t+1 maximizes the sum of private benefit and the expected continuation value of the firm to himself, as determined by the existing promised debt repayments, R t+1 , and the current state of the economy, r t . The choice of the survival probability will then face the trade-off between current private benefits and the access to future cash flows (which requires the firm to survive). Given the specification of U (p) in (2) and assuming an interior solution, we obtain the following closed-form solution for p t+1 as a function of R t+1 and r t ,
As long as the value of the firm for the entrepreneur is a decreasing function of R t , which is proved below, (8) shows a negative relationship between debt, R t+1 , and survival probability,
Finally, expression (7) is the lenders' participation constraint. Competition among lenders makes them willing to extent loans insofar as the promised repayment R t+1 (and the prospect of recovering L in case of failure) gives them an expected rate of return r t on their lending b t . In expression (7), expected payoff, which is equal to the survival probability times R t+1 plus the default probability times L, is in the left hand side, while the cost of the loan is in the right hand side. The amount lent today by the lender when the entrepreneur promises R t+1 can be found using (8) and the participation constraint as follows
which is not necessarily increasing in the promised amount, R t+1 . The potential non-monotonicity arises from the fact that the survival probability, p(R t+1 , r t ), is decreasing in R t+1 and could imply the existence of a maximum in the amount of debt an entrepreneur can receive at a given period.
We can use (8) and (9) in order to write the problem of the entrepreneur in a more compact way as
From this new formulation, we can obtain the properties of the value function V , which are derived in Appendix A. It is first showed that V (R t , r t ) is decreasing and concave in R t .
Then, it is also showed that exists a threshold value,R(r t ), such that for R t below it, the firm is unconstrained and can achieve the optimal level, R t+1 = R * (r t ) by paying positive dividend. Constrained firms, i.e. those with R t >R(r t ), set dividends equal to zero and R t+1 > R * (r t ). This is the main effect of the financial friction in our model: constrained firms have to rely on outside financing more than desired, which lead entrepreneurs to set higher failure probabilities. A more detailed analysis of the properties of the solution of this optimization problem requires numerical methods under specific values of the parameters, which is done in Section 4. Before doing so, we turn to analyze new entrepreneurs' problem and to define the equilibrium in our economy.
New entrepreneurs
The problem for new entrepreneurs, conditional upon entering the market, is very similar to the one for incumbent entrepreneurs. We can also write it in a recursive way as
subject to the non-negativity of entrepreneurs' dividends
It should be noted that the only difference with respect to the incumbents' problem is on the dynamic financing constraint, since new entrepreneurs have to face the initial investment of one unit, do not receive any cash flow from the project, and do not have any previous debt to pay. In spite of this change, the analysis of their decision is the same than the one conducted for incumbent entrepreneurs.
Equilibrium
Our economy does not have a steady state due to the aggregate uncertainty generated by the stochastic fluctuations in the interest rate, r t . Thus, we have to look for a "stationary" equilibrium in which the relevant variables follow an invariant law of motion. Intuitively, the economy will oscillate around the two "steady states" that would be reached if it remained in each of the two possible states of the economy, r H or r L , forever. The definition of this equilibrium is the following Definition 1. A stationary equilibrium in this economy is an invariant law of motion G for the distribution of firms on R space and a policy function x(R t , r t ), mapping current debt, R t , and state of the economy, r t , into future debt, R t+1 , such that
• Incumbent entrepreneurs solve their dynamic problem subject to lenders' participation constraint.
• New entrepreneurs decide optimally on entry.
• The aggregate law of motion G satisfies
where ϕ t (R) refers to the distribution of debt across firms in period t, and I(u) is an indicator function that equals one if u is true and zero otherwise.
Solving for the equilibrium requires then obtaining the solution to the dynamic programming problem that represents entrepreneurs' optimal decisions, solving the free entry condition of the new entrepreneurs, and finding an invariant law of motion for the distribution of firms compatible with the incumbent entrepreneurs' decisions and the entry and exit processes associated with these decisions.
Quantitative analysis
In this section, we aim to analyze the properties of the model under a realistic parameterization, while next section is devoted to the more detailed analysis of the effects of changes in the interest rate.
Calibration
There are nine parameters in the model: r H , r L , π HH , π LL , β, y, α, µ, and L. In order to further analyze the properties of our model, we need to set a value for each of these parameters. First, we take a year as the reference period. We do so because normally financing plans of firms are annual.
The first four parameters, (r H , r L , π HH , π LL ) are related to interest rate dynamics. We set r H and r L to be equal to 3 and 1 percent, respectively. The transition probabilities are
Table I Parameter values
This table reports the value of the parameters used in our analysis of the model. The first four rows are those parameters related to interest rate dynamics, which are set to reasonable values as explained in the text. The final five rows report the value of the rest of parameters, which are set to match the following empirical moments: rate of return of the stock market, the average delinquency rate, average recovery rate, average leverage ratio, and average interest coverage ratio. assumed to be equal in both states and equal to 0.8. Although these numbers are chosen arbitrarily, they are reasonable for these parameters. Transition probabilities of 0.8 mean that every state has an average duration of five years. In addition, the values chosen for r are reasonable if we take into account that they reflect real interest rates.
The other five parameters (β, y, µ, α, L) are calibrated to match some empirical moments.
First, the entrepreneurs' discount factor, β, is set such that the discount rate, 1 β − 1, matches the real stock market return for our sample period, which is around 6.5%. 7 This implies setting β equal to 0.9386.
The remaining four parameters are calibrated such that our model delivers four empirical moments found in data. The first two moments are aggregate moments: an average delinquency rate of 3.11%, which is the delinquency rate on commercial and industrial loans reported by the Federal Reserve Board, 8 and an average recovery rate of 45%, which is the 7 This mechanism to set the entrepreneurs' discount factor is common in the literature. See, for example, Michelacci and Quadrini (2009) 8 Note that although we calibrate the model to match delinquency rates, we present default rates in the tables because they are a more frequent statistic. Delinquency rates are defined as the dollar volume of defaulted loans divided by total value of outsanding loans, while default rates are the number of defaulted loans divided by the total number of loans. As long as, in our model, bigger loans are those with higher default probabilities, delinquency rates are higher than default rates. ratio assumed in the Basel II formulas for capital requirements and has been widely used in the literature. The scarcity of data for new firms forces us to choose the other moments to be matched by mature firms in our economy. These two moments are an average leverage ratio of 33.2%, calculated from COMPUSTAT by Morellec et al. (2008) , and an average interest coverage ratio of 15.8%, as reported in Blume et al. (1998) . These two moments have to be matched by firms with more than 12 years, which are our mature firms as will be clear later.
In our model, leverage ratio is defined as the ratio between the market value of debt, b t , and the sum of market values of debt and equity, b t + V (R t , r t ). Following Whited (1992) , the interest coverage ratio is defined as the ratio between interest payments, R t − b t−1 and the sum of interest payments and cash flows,
It is clear form the presentation of the calibration mechanism that the average recovery rate pins down the parameter L. The other three moments will jointly determine the value for rest of the parameters (α, µ, y). The values for all the parameters are reported in Table I .
We can interpret the empirical validity of some of these parameters. For example, the parameter y can be understood as the Return on Assets (ROA). A value of 10.31% for this accounting ratio is in line with standard measures. We can also calculate the average private benefit obtained by entrepreneurs. It turns out to represent a 30% of their total cash flows. This figure is well in the range found by Dyck and Zingales (2004) .
General properties
This section presents the analysis of the properties of the model, postponing the study of the effects of interest rates on default rates to the next section. First, we summarize some relevant moments from our calibrated model. Then, we turn to analyze the decisions taken by the entrepreneurs in our parameterization. Finally, we study the implications of the model in terms of firm dynamics.
Given the parameterization we have just described we can use our model to simulate the economy and study its properties. Concretely, we simulate 1,000 economies for 300 periods and study the last 25 periods of each economy. 9 Table II reports some moments we obtain from these simulations. These moments are calculated by averaging each moment in each state across simulations. We also report the unconditional means. Several figures require a comment. 9 We need to simulate for a large number of periods before analyzing the model in order to make sure that the economy converges to its stationary level.
Table II Simulated moments
This table reports relevant moments for our economy. Given the parameterization in Table I , we simulate 1,000 economies for 300 periods and pick only the 25 last periods. Reported moments are calculated by averaging the corresponding moment in each state of the economy. Young firms are those that are equal to or less than ten years old, while old firms are those firms that are more than ten years old. First, we notice the almost inexistent difference in aggregate default rates in both states of the economy. This is a consequence of the aggregation across firms in different stages of their lives. If we compare default rates in both states within age group, the differences are much sharper. Also, the difference between both groups is also notable. As it will become clearer later, the behaviour of each group after a change in the interest rate is totally opposite, which can explain than in average both effects cancel out.
Second, it is also worth mentioning the differences in leverage ratios within and between age groups. We obtain a higher aggregate leverage ratio in states of the economy with low interest rates. Again, this fact is reversed for younger firms. In the comparison between groups, it is remarkable the difference between both leverage ratios (45% for young firms versus 33% for old firms). All these differences between young and old firms will be analyzed below. Now, we turn to study the decisions taken by entrepreneurs in this model. First of all,
Figure 1. Value and policy functions
This figure plots the value function and debt policy function in our economy given the parameters obtained in the calibration. Upper panel corresponds to the value function, V , as a function of debt, R t , and the state of the economy, r t . In the lower panel, the debt policy function is depicted also as a function of debt and the state of the economy.
we analyze the value and policy functions, which are plotted in Figure 1 . As expected, the value function is decreasing in the level of debt. This is due to the fact that, the higher the debt, the lower the fraction of the firm that goes to the entrepreneur. Also, the value function is decreasing in the interest rate: as debt becomes more expensive, the value of the firm is depreciated.
The most important function is probably the policy function that relates current debt with future debt depending on the current interest rate, plotted in the right panel of Figure 1 . In this figure, we can see the policy function when interest rates are low (dashed line) and when interest rates are high (solid line), and the 45-degree line. Three issues are worth mentioning from this figure. First, note that the stationary (and optimal) levels of debt in each of the states are determined by the crossing between the 45-degree line and each of the policy functions. These are the levels at which all firms would like to be in each of the states. The first thing to note is that the optimal level of debt with high interest rates is lower than the optimal level with low interest rates. This is because the interest rate mainly determines the price of debt, so an increase in the interest rate increases the price of debt.
Secondly, as we have seen in the analysis of the previous section, this optimal level is attainable only for current levels of debt low enough. Otherwise, the repayment of current debt prevents firms to achieve the optimal level, and they are forced to issue more debt than desired. This, in turn, will make them to have higher default probabilities. Finally, we can also observe in the figure that, while going from the optimal level with high interest rates to the optimal level with low interest rates can be done directly, the same is not true the other way around. That is, if the firm is in the optimal level with low interest rates and the interest rate changes, it can not jump directly to the new (lower) target level, but it has to spend some periods reducing its debt. This fact will be determinant when explaining the effect of changes in the interest rate.
An additional issue to be analyzed from the model is its implications on firm dynamics.
The firms in our model differ basically because of their age. There is also heterogeneity because of past history of each firms, but this is a minor source of diversity among firms. Thus, we can analyze how the two key measures of our model, default rates and leverage ratios, evolve with age. Figure 2 plots these two functions. We plot them as a function of the initial state of the economy as it can be an important determinant of both variables in earlier periods of life. Both figures show that default rate as well as the amount of debt decreases with age. This is consistent with empirical literature in this area. The reason for this finding is as follows.
Firms have to finance the initial investment with debt as they have no equity. The leverage ratio implied in this operation is higher than the optimal leverage in any of the two states of the economy. Thus, firms start their lives with more debt than desired. As long as they survive and receive net cash flows from the project, they can reduce the amount of debt until they reach the optimal one. This is why at some point (around 9 to 14 years after starting the project), the level of debt becomes stationary. As default rates are function of the level of debt, the decreasing pattern observed in debt is replicated in the figure for default rates.
A final aspect to be mentioned is the endogenous age distribution of firms that the model delivers. This distribution is depicted in Figure 3 . The figure is constructed by averaging the distribution of firms for all the periods in a simulation of 10,000 periods. It can be observed that the distribution resembles the shape of either an exponential or a Pareto distribution. To the best of our knowledge, there is no an empirical paper that deals with the age distribution of firms. However, this empirical exercise have been conducted for the size distribution of firms, being the exponential and the Pareto distributions the ones with more empirical support.
Effects of shifts in the interest rate
In this section, we analyze which is the effect of changing the interest rate on default rates.
We divide the analysis in two parts: individual effects and aggregate effects.
Individual effects
Given the different behavior of firms according to their financial situation, we expect interest rate changes to affect firms in different ways. For this reason, we conduct the analysis of the effect of a shift in the interest rates from the individual perspective. As it has been mentioned before, individual firms in our model are mainly characterized by their age. Thus, the analysis will deal with the effect of changes in the interest rate for firms in different stages of their life.
This analysis is done as follows. We simulate our economy for 10,500 periods. In order to get rid of any effect of initial conditions, we drop the first 500 periods. For each of the periods, we collect default rates, both at the individual (age-dependent) level and at the aggregate level.
With these time series, we can estimate the following equation
wherep t,i is the observed default rate for firms of age i at period t. This exercise allows us to quantify the effect, j periods ahead, of a shift in the interest rate for firms of age i. The coefficients of interest are δ L ij for the effect of an increase in the interest rate, and δ H ij for the effect of a decrease in the interest rate. Note that with this specification, we are obtaining the deviations from a counterfactual path in which the interest rate did not change j periods ago. Figure 4 plots the effect of an increase (left) and a decrease (right) for one year old firms (solid line) and 15 years old firms (dashed line). 11 In the horizontal axis, we represent the time after the shift in the interest rate (that is, j, in (14)). Two things are worth mentioning: the different reaction of firms of different ages to changes in the interest rate and the asymmetric effect of increases and decreases in the interest rate for firms of the same age. The first fact is due to the different financial situation that firms with different ages have.
Consider the effect of an increase in r. The new optimal leverage ratio is lower than the prevailing one before the shift in r. No firm can adjust immediately, as we have seen in Figure 1 . However, old firms need less periods in order to reach it. Instead, young firms have more difficulties in arriving to this new optimal level.
The intuition is the same for the case of a decrease in r. In this case, mature firms adjust immediately to the new higher leverage ratio, that implies higher default probabilities. Instead, for young firms the new target ratio is still lower than the one they have at the moment of the change. Thus, they have to decrease their leverage ratio, which implies a lower default probability. Note that this does not mean that young firms have lower default probabilities than older ones, since their default rate before the change was much higher than the one for old firms.
Comparing both panels in Figure 4 , we can also observe the asymmetric effect of increases and decreases in r for firms of the same age group. This is particularly true for old firms: the effect after a decrease is immediate and sharp. Instead, the effect after an increase is smoother and takes more periods. The reason for this to happen is the uncapability of adjusting immediately to the new optimal debt level after an increase in r. For young firms this is not so clear, since they have problems in adjusting to new state of the economy both, after an increase and after a decrease in the short-term interest rate.
Aggregate effects
Another dimension of the analysis of the effects of changes in the short-term interest rate is the aggregate dimension, that is, how does the aggregate default rate changes with an increase or a decrease in r. Aggregate effects are computed by estimating equation (14), with p t,i substituted by the aggregate default rate. Figure 5 plots the aggregate effects.
As mature firms are the predominant ones in our simulated economy, the aggregate effects are mostly driven by them. However, it has to be noted the smaller magnitude of both effects at the aggregate level when compared to effects at the firm-level. The parameterization of the model that we are using generates an endogenous age distribution of firms such that the effects of young and old firms cancel out each other.
The qualitative effects showed in this figure could be used as a guidance for empirical work. In this sense, Figure 5 suggests that the risk-free rate has to enter in a nonlinear way when trying to estimate the determinants of default rates.
Figure 5. Aggregate effects of changes in the interest rate
This figure shows the variation in aggregate default rates (in percentage points) after an increase and a decrease in the interest rate. The variation is computed as the deviation from a counterfactual path in which the interest rate does not shift at time 0.
Extensions and discussion
This section is divided in two parts. In the first one, we provide an extended version of the model in which long-term debt is included. In the second part of the section, we analyze what is the effect of aggregate uncertainty in our model, by examining the case in which interest rates are constant.
Long-term debt
The model just presented deals with short-term debt. One could think that allowing for a more flexible structure of debt could alter the results we have presented. For this reason, we develop here an extended version of the model in which entrepreneurs issue long-term debt at the beginning of their lives.
This new alternative is assumed to be a perpetual debt, whereby firms receive some funds at period 0 in exchange for paying some constant coupon, denoted by z, the rest of their lives. In order to keep the model tractable, we deny to entrepreneurs the possibility of optimizing the issuance of the perpetual coupon. Thus, a fixed coupon is issued.
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As the coupon is constant and signed at the very beginning, the problem of incumbent entrepreneurs does not change at all, the only difference being that the net cash flow in every period is reduced by z V (R t , r t ) = max
The main difference is related to new entrepreneurs. As the issuance of long-term debt is fixed, they will have to issue a lower amount of short-term debt to finance the initial investment. Given the coupon, z, long-term creditors will lend an amount Λ(R t+1 , r t ), such that this quantity is equal to their future expected cash flows from the payment of the coupon. This function is defined as
Thus, the problem for new entrepreneurs will be W (r t ) = max
subject to (17), (18), and the dynamic financing constraint
Within this extended version of the model, two different exercises can be conducted. We could either analyze what happens to the economy of previous sections when we add the possibility for a long-term debt, or we can construct a new economy and recalibrate it to match empirical moments. For both exercises, we consider a coupon, z, equal to 0.004, which is the maximum amount allowed by the model parameterized as in previous sections.
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For the first exercise, we just use the parameters in Table I and simulate the economy to analyze its properties. Most relevant moments are reported in third and fourth columns in Table III , compared to those of the benchmark economy reported in first and second column. It is remarkable the increase in default rates in the new economy. This comes as a result of the reduction in net cash flow, which is now y − z. This lower level of cash flow reduces incentives of entrepreneurs to set low default probabilities. The second exercise involves recalibrating the entire model. We do so by using the same moments as in Section 4.1. We simulate the economy and obtain some moments which are reported in the fifth and sixth columns in Table III . As in the previous case, no substantial differences are found with respect to the benchmark case with only short-term debt available.
The most interesting feature of this exercise is that dispersion of average moments across different states of the economy increases in the extended version of the model. This happens because the distribution of firms have changed in such a way that the effects of increases and decreases in the interest rate does not cancel out anymore.
For this recalibrated version of the model, we also compare how the effects of a shift in the interest rate change with and without long-term debt. In Figure 6 , we plot these effects joint with those of the benchmark model. Effects are not very different when allowing for long-term debt. 
Effects of aggregate uncertainty
An additional exercise our model allows us to perform is to analyze the effect of uncertainty per se. In other words, we can study what would happen in our economy if we modify the degree of aggregate uncertainty. We can either eliminate uncertainty by setting the same interest rate for both states or increase it by widening the spread between interest rates of each state. In Table IV , we present the simulated moments of an economy with the same structural parameters than the one presented in Section 4, but without aggregate uncertainty.
Real interest rate is set to 2%, which is the unconditional mean of the Markov chain presented in previous sections.
The most important message from this table is that aggregate uncertainty is specially This table compares relevant moments of two economies with and without aggregate uncertainty (first and second column, respectively). The economy with aggregate uncertainty is the one presented in the text. For the economy without aggregate uncertainty, the real interest rate is set equal to the unconditional mean of the Markov (2%). The rest of the parameters are as in Table I . We simulate an economy for 10,000 periods. We drop the first 300 periods to avoid any dependence on initial conditions. Reported moments are calculated by averaging the corresponding moment in each state of the economy. Young firms are those that are equal to or less than ten years old, while old firms are those firms that are more than ten years old. The first column refers to the unconditional means. clear that the reaction of young firms is stronger. Their leverage ratios are reduced slightly, while those of old firms remain almost equal. The reduction in leverage ratio of young firms implies a reduction in the average default rate too, which in turn motivates the fall in credit spreads face by these firms.
These results cannot be taken as normative, since fluctuations in the short-term interest rates in our model are totally random. So, it is not surprising its impact is negative. In the real world, monetary policy shocks may respond to an active monetary policy strategy that seeks compensating the effects of other aggregate shocks. If that is effective, its effects may be beneficial. Yet our results suggest that this active policy does not come without cost in terms of firm financing decisions and credit risk.
Conclusions
Monetary policies leading to a long period of (too) low interest rates have been mentioned as a possible factor for the current financial crisis. Taking some distance from this assessment, this paper proposes a theoretical model that allows us to understand the importance of fluctuations in this variable in terms of financing decisions of firms and how it impacts credit risk.
We construct a corporate financing model with two key frictions: a moral hazard between entrepreneur and her borrowers, and the impossibility of entrepreneurs to raise from sources other than earnings retention or short-term debt. We embed this model into an economy characterized by entry and exit of firms, which allows us to consider industry dynamics effects.
We use a reasonable parameterization of the model in order to analyze its properties. It delivers patterns of leverage ratio and default probabilities consistent with empirical evidence.
As for the effect of shifts in the interest rate, two findings are worth mentioning. First, young and old firms react very differently to a change in the interest rate. This is due to their different financial situation before the shift in the interest rate. Second, increases and decreases of the short-term interest rate have asymmetric effects both at the firm and at the aggregate level. The qualitative predictions of our model have to be taken into account in analyzing the effects of fluctuations in the interest rate on leverage and credit risk. Concretely, it suggests two important issues for empirical work: (i) the financial situation of a firm before a shift in the interest rate could be an important determinant of the effect of this change, and (ii) increases and decreases in the interest rate have to be analyzed separately.
The model can be extended in several dimensions. An obvious extension is about the empirical implications of the model. Proper data on financial situation and defaults at firm level can be used to test whether the empirical implications of the model are validated in data.
As for the theoretical model, one could think of two main extensions. First, a richer debt structure can be considered in order to fully capture the extent to which fluctuations in the interest rate can be hedged by means of longer term debt. Second, industry dynamics literature has showed the importance of firm size. Thus, one could think of a model with a variable amount of investment and idiosyncratic shocks that determine the optimal size of each firm. This way, firms would be heterogeneous both in the age and the size dimensions, as normally assumed in the industry dynamics literature.
It is clear from this expression that the optimal solution for unconstrained firms does not depend on R t . By means of the envelope theorem it can be easily found that the derivative of v(R t+1 ) with respect to R t+1 in the unconstrained region is minus one, which means that the value function in this region is linear and decreasing.
The optimality condition for constrained firms states that
joint with the constraint in (A.2) satisfied with equality
Implicit differentiation in (A.8) tells us that the derivative of R t+1 with respect to R t will be
The derivative of v(R t ) over R t in the constrained region can then be written as .10) Since in the constrained region, λ > 0, expression (A.7) can be rewritten as .11) which, together with (A.10), can be used to state that v (R t ) in the constrained region is lower than minus one. This means then that the function v(R t ) is decreasing and concave in the constrained region, which proves part (i) of the proposition. Parts (ii) and (iii) are results of the preceding derivations. The unconstrained region will consist of those levels of current debt, R t that can allow to reach the optimal level, R * . Thus, the threshold,R, can be defined as .12) All firms with R t lower thanR will reach the optimal level, R * , and will set positive dividends. Instead, firms with R t above that level, will be forced to set dividends equal to zero.
Moreover, R t+1 for those firms will be higher than R * .
